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Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Robert Stevens Miller, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the most comprehensive as-
sortment of legislative aids to disadvantaged minorities in our
nation's history. Cast against the background of the Negro
Revolution, the act stands out as the response from Congress to
the problems of discrimination in our society. Sweeping pro-
visions grant the Negro equal access to voting booths,' to public
accommodations, 2 and to employment.3 Nearly forgotten amid
the flood of publicity devoted to the racial aspect of the act is
another significant beneficiary-the woman. The Civil Rights
Act makes it as unlawful for an employer to deny a job to a
person on the basis of sex as on the basis of race.
The act appears to treat these two bases of discrimination,
race and sex, in the same terms; yet there is reason to believe
that the problems in the two areas are quite different. This
article considers the special problems raised by the ban on dis-
crimination on the basis of sex by means of an analysis of the
provisions of the act, a description of the legislative history of
the sex provisions, and a discussion of the constitutional and
legislative aspects of classification by sex. There follows an
analysis of the approach taken by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, and finally a discussion of some of the
problems raised by state legislation relating to classification by
sex.
I. THE BASIC PROVISfONS OF TITLE VII
Title VII of the act, the Equal Employment Opportunity
title, declares a new national policy which forbids any employ-
ment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin, in nearly all industries affecting interstate com-
merce. It imposes new obligations on employers, labor unions
and employment agencies. It grants new rights to employees,
job seekers and disadvantaged minorities. It establishes a five
* Member of the California Bar.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964).
2. Id. §§ 2000a-2000b-3(1964).
3. Id. §§ 2000e-2000e-15(1964).
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member Equal Employment Opportunity Commission4 to guide
the administration of the act and to encourage compliance with
it.
The heart of the new law is the obligation which it imposes
on employers through the following provisions:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any in-
dividual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individuals race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin .... 5
[It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer] to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.6
Parallel provisions proscribe discriminatory conduct by employ-
ment agencies in referring or classifying job applicants.7 Labor
unions are prohibited from excluding or expelling any indi-
vidual from membership on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin,8 or so acting as to deprive an individual
of equal employment opportunities. 9 Further, apprenticeship
and on-the-job training programs must be administered by
employers and unions on a nondiscriminatory basis.' 0
There are, however, various exceptions to these general pro-
hibitions in specific instances. An educational institution sup-
ported by a religion" is specifically exempted from the act's
proscriptions. Employers with fewer than seventy-five employ-
ees are presently exempt from coverage, although the number
will be reduced annually until it reaches twenty-five. 12 Dis-
4. In May of 1965, President Johnson appointed five members to
comprise the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, with Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt, Jr., as chairman. The Commission employs a staff of
several hundred persons, with headquarters in Washington, D.C. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMMISSION, FACTS ABOUT TITLE VII OF THE
CImnI RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
CoM1IVssION (1965).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2090e-2 (a) (1) (1964).
6. Id. § 2OOe-2(a) (2).
7. Id. § 2OOe-2(b).
8. Id. § 2OO0e-2(c) (1).
9. Id. § 20OOe-2(c) (2)-(3).
10. Id. § 20OOe-2(d).
11. Id. § 2000e-2(e).
12. Id. § 2000e(b). This subsection defines "employer" to exclude
those employing fewer than 100 employees. This exclusion applied
during the first year after the effective date of the Title, July 2, 1965.
During the second year the relevant number of employees became 75;
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crimination is allowed where necessary for compliance with a
government security program.13 Moreover, discrimination is spe-
cifically allowed with respect to members of communist organi-
zations.14 Preferential treatment of Indians living on or near a
reservation is also excepted from proscription.15
These exceptions to Title VII are generally narrow in scope
and relatively easy to interpret. There is, however, one excep-
tion of broad significance, particularly for the problem of sex
discrimination:- the subsection which provides that it is not an
unfair employment practice to discriminate against an individual,
.on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of that particular business or enterprise .... 16
The concept of a "bona fide occupational qualification" phrased
in terms of reasonable necessity and normal operation is the key
to the enforcement of the act as it relates to sex discrimination.
The language is at best ambiguous, and admits of a wide range
of possible interpretations. Narrowly read, the provision permits
sex discrimination only in extreme cases, such as washroom at-
tendants or actors and actresses. However, the exception could
be read broadly enough to deny a woman any job which an em-
ployer, his other employees, or his customers deem to be a "man's
job."
There is, unfortunately, no other language in Title VII which
helps clarify the imprecise concept of a "bona fide occupational
qualification." The search for guidance in its interpretation
leads naturally to two sources: the legislative history of the
statute, and the national policy of sex classification as found in
constitutional interpretation and legislative action.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In a broad sense, the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is coextensive with our nation's history. Even in
the narrow sense, the history of the act is spread over thousands
of pages of committee hearing transcripts, 17 Congressional Rec-
during the third year, the number drops to 50; and thereafter the num-
ber will be 25.
13. Id. § 2000e-2(g).
14. Id. § 2000e-2(f).
15. Id. § 2000e-2(i).
16. Id. § 2000e-2(e).
17. The hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary
concerning the Civil Rights Bill and related proposals are contained in
four bound volumes totalling 2780 pages. Hearings Before Subcom-
19671
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ord debate,'8 and newspaper accounts.
The bill reported out of committee in November of 1963 was
quite similar to the final act. It had taken shape during four
months of exhaustive committee hearings in the summer of 1963
in which interested groups had generous opportunities to present
their views to the committee. 19 The bill, however, contained no
ban on sex discrimination; rather, its Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Title prohibited only discriminations based on race, color,
religion, or national origin. In fact, the matter of sex dis-
crimination had not even been considered during the hearings.2 0
In view of the political pressures which surrounded the bill, it is
hardly surprising that no one viewed it as a vehicle to secure
equal rights for women.
After a favorable report by the Judiciary Committee, the
bill went to the House Rules Committee, presided over by the
bill's principal opponent, Representative Howard Smith of Vir-
ginia. It was on the last day in the House Rules Committee
that the word "sex" first appeared in the record in relation to
Title VII; at that time a motion to add sex to the proscribed
bases of discrimination was defeated 8-7.21 Thus, on January 30,
1964, the House of Representatives began consideration of a civil
rights bill was was still limited to prohibition of discrimination
on ethnic grounds.
The heated debate on the House floor lasted nearly two
weeks, but "sex" discrimination was not considered until the
day before the passage of the act. 'Representative Howard Smith
proposed an amendment to include sex within the discrimination
bases banned by Title VI. 22 Smith professed to be serious about
the matter, claiming that women have just as much right to be
mittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Repre-
sentatives on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963).
18. The prolonged and intense debate that preceded passage of the
Civil Rights Bill in the Senate lasted for eighty-three days. 110 CONG.
REC. 2882-14506 (1964).
19. During the course of these hearings, the testimony related
to all the subjects of the legislative proposals .... The sub-
committee afforded to all who were interested a reasonable op-
portunity to present their views on the proposals. Those who
did not appear personally were given an opportunity to submit
any relevant matter for the record.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1963).
20. See Hearings on Civil Rights, supra note 17.
21. 20 CONG. QuARTERLY 344 (1964); N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1964,
p. 12, col. 3.
22. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964).
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free from discrimination as any other minority group. "This bill
is so imperfect, what harm will this little amendment do?" he
asked.23 Another Southern Congressman, who characterized him-
self as "vigorously opposed" to the whole bill, added that, "some
men in this country might support legislation which would dis-
criminate against women, but never let it be said that a southern
gentleman would vote for such legislation. '24
Representative Emanuel Celler of New York, the floor mana-
ger of the bill, led a half-hearted opposition to the amendment.
It was difficult for anyone to speak against the amendment with-
out appearing to favor discrimination against women, a position
politically dangerous and hard to defend logically. All Celler
could say was, "I think the amendment seems illogical, ill timed,
ill placed, and improper."25 He read into the Record an excerpt
from the Report of the President's Commission on the Status of
Women, which concluded:
[D]iscrimination based on sex, the Commission believes,
involves problems sufficiently different from discrimination
based on the other factors listed to make separate treatment
preferable.
In view of this policy conclusion reached by representa-
tives from a variety of women's organizations and private and
public agencies to attack discriminations based on sex separ-
ately, we are of the opinion that to attempt to so amend H.R.
7152 would not be to the best advantage of women at this
time.26
Many Congresswomen took the opportunity to deplore the
suppressed role of women in American life. The appeals in
favor of the amendment were based largely on emotional reac-
tions and at times bordered on irrelevancy. 7 Fears were ex-
23. Ibid.
24. Id. at 2583.
25. Id. at 2578.
26. Id. at 2577. The quoted excerpt was included in a letter to
Representative Celler from the Women's Bureau of the Department of
Labor concerning the inclusion of sex provisions in Title VII.
27. In speaking in favor of the amendment, Mrs. Griffiths of
Michigan stated:
Mr. Chairman, a vote against this amendment today by a
white man is a vote against his wife, or his widow, or his daugh-
ter, or his sister.
110 CONc. REc. 2580 (1964). Mrs. St. George of New York said:
We do not want special privileges. We do not need special
privileges. We outlast you-we outlive you-we nag you to
death. So why should we want special privileges?
I believe we can hold our own. We are entitled to this
little crumb of equality.
The addition of that terrifying little word "s-e-x" will not
hurt this legislation in any way. In fact, it will improve it.
It will make it comprehensive. It will make it logical. It will
1967]
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pressed that without the sex amendment to Title VII, Negro
women would be given an advantage over white women.28 Only
one Congresswoman, Oregon's Edith Green, generally regarded
as a champion of equal rights for women, spoke against the
amendment. Since a few months earlier she had succeeded in
having the Equal Pay Act of 1963 passed over the strenuous ob-
jections of the suddenly chivalrous Southerners, it is not sur-
prising that she expressed some doubt as to their good faith:
As much as I hope the day will come when discrimination
will be ended against women, I really and sincerely hope that
this amendment will not be added to this bill It will clutter
up the bill and it may later-very well-be used to help de-
stroy this section of the bill by some of those very people who
today support it.29
The discussion of the sex amendment lasted almost two
hours, but the record provides little indication of congressional
intent as to interpretation of the amendment. Following an af-
firmative teller vote of the House,80 the word "sex" was in-
serted in each place where the words "race, color, religion, or
national origin" appeared. The excessive haste involved is fur-
ther evidenced by Smith's admission on the next day that he
had forgotten to insert "sex" in a number of places in Title VII
where it now belonged.3 '
The bill encountered several months of prolonged and heated
debate in the Senate. The problem of discrimination on the
basis of sex, however, was never seriously considered. The pro-
ponents of the bill had decided that the paramount interest of
make it right.
Id. at 2581.
28. Mrs. Griffiths of Michigan pointed out this problem of possible
disadvantage to white women based on the fear that employers, over-
zealous in their efforts to comply with the new ban on racial discrimi-
nation or to avoid prosecution, would give preferential treatment to
Negro women that would be denied to white women.
I rise in support of this amendment primarily because I feel
as a white woman when this bill has passed this House and the
Senate and has been signed by.the President that white women
will be last at the hiring gate.
Id. at 2578.
29. Id. at 2581. All nine members of Congress who joined Mrs.
Green in voicing opposition to the sex amendment voted for the Civil
Rights Bill as a whole. Conversely, only-one of the eleven male mem-
bers who spoke in favor of the amendment voted for the Civil Rights
Bill as amended.
30. The teller vote, by means of which an accurate tally of votes
is made without recording the votes of the individual Congressmen,
resulted in a margin of 168-133 in favor of the sex amendment. 110
CONG. REC. 2584 (1964).
31. 110 CONG. REC. 2720 (1964).
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getting the bill passed precluded any major alteration of the
House version, since changes would necessarily involve addi-
tional discussion and further delay of final action.32 Thus the
sex provision went without challenge, and virtually without men-
tion. The Senate debates are therefore of no assistance in inter-
preting the act's proscription of employment discrimination on
the basis of sex.
Consequently, the legislative history is little help to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in administering
that part of Title VII forbidding sex discrimination. Moreover,
it is not unfair to label the sex amendment an "orphan, '33 for
apparently only a handful of Congressmen actually supported
both the addition of sex to Title VII, and the bill as so amended.
34
Congresswoman Green was undoubtedly correct in her judgment
that as a separate bill, the sex amendment would have had little
chance of passage.3 5 Hence, the sex provisions of Title VII can
32. 20 CONG. QuARTERLY 357 (1964).
33. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 31 BROOxLYN L. REv. 62, 79 (1964).
34. 110 CONG. REc. 2581 (1964). In a letter to the author, Jan. 17,
1966, Mrs. Green commented:
The very people who most strongly opposed this bill ...
became the strongest advocates of the "sex amendment.".
As if this were not enough of a clue to its mischievous intent,
the fact that the sponsor of the amendment was the leader of
the civil rights opposition in the House left no room for doubt.
I believed then, and I believe now, that the "intent" of the
sponsor of the bill was to enlist additional opposition to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Bill. Fortunately this tactic did not suc-
ceed, but at the time it was by no mears certain that it would
not.
In addition I opposed the amendment because it was hastily
drawn and without the benefit of any hearings.... Any law
which will affect millions of citizens deserves greater considera-
tion than this, and it was immediately apparent that harrassing
and needlessly annoying problems could ensue from enactment
of such a broadly drawn amendment.
A contrary position is expressed in a letter to the author from
Representative Smith, Jan. 4, 1966:
The statement that the amendment was "slipped in" the bill
by me in an attempt to delay voting, is utterly untrue, as the
record shows.
The amendment was a popular one. Particularly active in
its adoption were the women Members of the House. It was de-
bated fully and adopted in the House in open debate, and sub-
sequently approved in the Senate.
35. Congresswoman Green took the occasion of the perfecting
amendment to deplore once again the impropriety of the whole matter:
[I]n my judgment, if this amendment... were being con-
sidered by itself, and it were brought to the floor with no hear-
ings and no testimony, such a piece of legislation would not
receive one hundred votes. In fact, it would probably be laughed
off the floor by some of the gentlemen who this week are seem-
1967]
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be viewed more as an accidental result of political maneuvering
than as a clear expression of congressional intent to bring equal
job opportunities to women.
Since the legislative process surrounding the sex provisions
falls far short of the ideal, it might be concluded that sex dis-
crimination should be ignored, or at least played down, in the
administration of the act. "Why should a mischievous joke per-
petrated on the floor of the House of Representatives be treated
by a responsible administrative body with this kind of serious-
ness?" inquired one periodical,3 6 upon learning of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's active concern with wo-
men's employment opportunities. The answers to that question
lie beneath the surface of the limited discussion that occurred
in Congress.
Congress was moved to enact Title VII by the appalling
statistics concerning the economic status of the Negro American.
Striking similarities exist in the corresponding statistics con-
cerning women. Women predominate only in such positions as
clerical work and private household employment; 37 supervisory
and managerial positions are strictly male dominated.3 8
More significantly, within each general category of employ-
ment, the median income of women is about half that of men in
the same field.39 Whatever may be said for their accuracy, such
statistics corroborate what is generally assumed: men have a
distinct advantage over women in employment opportunities, job
advancement, and compensation. Consequently, regardless of the
political motivation of the sex provisions of Title VII, there is
an economic justification for such legislation.
Further, it would be wholly inaccurate to assume that the
ban on sex discrimination was merely an innovation of Repre-
sentative Smith which suddenly appeared on the floor of the
House. The President's Commission on the Status of Women had
ingly giving it its strongest support, some of whom are openly
and honestly seeking to kill the entire bill.
110 CoNG. REc. 2720 (1964).
36. The New Republic, Sept. 4, 1965, p. 10.
37. 'Among "clerical workers,' females outnumber males by a ratio
of more than 2 to 1. Among "private household workers," females out-
number males by a ration of nearly 40 to 1. UNITED STATES BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 230-35
(86th ed. 1965).
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. It is interesting to note that the median income of male
workers in each occupational classification stays about double that of
females in the same classification over the whole range of classifica-
tions from the lowest paid to the highest.
[Vol. 51:877
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recommended an equal opportunity bill for women, but because
of the special problems involved its inclusion in the Civil Rights
Bill was not recommended. Successful passage during the previ-
ous session of the Equal Pay Act of 196340 demonstrates that Con-
gress was willing to respond to the demand for fairer treatment
of women. Accordingly, it would be a mistake to place too much
emphasis on the particular circumstances in which the ban on
sex discrimination was passed.
III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF CLASSIFICATION BY SEX
The exception to the prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of sex in "those certain instances where . . .sex . . . is a
bona fide occupational qualification. .. ,41 permits a broad range
of judicial and administrative interpretation. Since legislative
history is not particularly helpful in this regard, one must turn
to an additional source of guidance: the national policy with
respect to classification on the basis of sex, as derived from ju-
dicial interpretation of the Constitution and from legislative ac-
tion. A desirable interpretation of Title VII should be consis-
tent with this national policy. Thus, if there are important dif-
ferences between the legal backgrounds of classification by sex
and by ethnic group it is likely that a different kind or degree
of enforcement of the sex provisions of the act is desirable.
Conversely, if there are close analogies in the legal developments,
the sex provisions should be enforced with the same spirit and
vigor that characterizes enforcement of the ethnic provisions.
The Constitution is the first point of reference in assessing
the legal position of women in America. The only express men-
tion of classification by sex is found in the nineteenth amend-
ment, which guarantees women the right to vote. The language
of the amendment is precisely parallel to the fifteenth amend-
ment, which guarantees that right to Negroes. Thus, it appears
that the Constitution, insofar as it has affirmatively proscribed
sex discrimination, does so in the same manner that it proscribes
racial discrimination. Of course, the scope of these provisions
is limited to voting rights.
Constitutional bans on sex and racial discrimination in voting
rights are quite different from the ban on discrimination in the
economic and social legislation of the states. With regard to the
latter, the Constitution is applicable through the due process and
40. 77 Stat. 56 (1963), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
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equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Unlike
the area of voting rights, here the Constitution is translated by
the Supreme Court into different languages, one for classifica-
tions based on race, and another for classifications based on sex.
The scope of the due process clause has been litigated with
respect to discrimination in the area of jury selection on numer-
ous occasions. An early case, Strauder v. West Virginia,42 held
that discrimination by the states on the basis of race as to jury
duty was invalid, but that the same was not true of discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex. More recently, Ballard v. United States,4 3
held that women could not be excluded from federal juries, but
this decision was based on the supervisory power over federal
courts rather than on due process grounds. The court said that
"the two sexes are not fungible."44 Thus, it is significant that
even as to a function of citizenship, where discriminations are
most susceptible to elimination, distinctions on the basis of sex
are still permitted.
The principal weapon utilized in constitutional attacks on
discrimination has been the equal protection clause. For the
Negro, the equal protection clause has prevented discriminatory
state legislation, and since Brown v. Board of Education,45 the
scope of the constitutional ban on racial discrimination has been
expanded to include private action having even the most tenuous
link with state action.46 These decisions have no doubt encour-
aged positive action by the legislatures, such as Congress' passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to further eradicate racial bar-
riers, even at the level of private decision.
Turning to the problem of sex discrimination, the contrast
is startling. State legislation which treats the female sex as a
special class in a variety of contexts has survived constitutional
attack in every Supreme Court case. The Court's willingness to
accept the legislative judgment that sex is a valid basis for classi-
fication has precluded any real challenge to the reasonableness
of such classification.47
42. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
43. 329 U.S. 187 (1946). For a recent discussion of the constitu-
tional right of women defendants not to have women excluded from
the jury, see 51 MiNw. L. REv. 552 (1967).
44. Id. at 193.
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961).
47. The Supreme Court, in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908),
held valid a maximum hour law, stating that sex is a valid basis for
classification. Id. at 422. This language has been broadly applied in
[Vol. 51:877
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The sharp contrast between constitutional doctrines in the
areas of sex and racial classifications must be considered as a
relevant factor by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion in interpreting Title VII. The growing and well-defined
national policy that a man should be measured by his individual
worth, with his race regarded as an irrelevancy, points the way
for the Commission in that area. Hence, a vigorous application
of a law banning discrimination in employment against individu-
als on the basis of race is justified.
Just as clearly, our national policy with respect to equality
for women has not been aimed at the same goal. Conceding
that women are or should be entitled to the same rights as men
with respect to citizenship, few foresee or hope for a day when
a person will be viewed as an individual without regard to sex.
Even the Civil Rights Act contemplates some valid distinctions
between the sexes in the exception for a "bona fide occupational
qualification," which is not available as to classification on the
basis of race or color.
48
subsequent cases involving attacks on state laws which classify on the
basis of sex.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), concerned the
validity of minimum wage laws for women. The Court answered the
contention that the applicability of the statute only to women was an
arbitrary discrimination:
The argument that the legislation in question constitutes an
arbitrary discrimination, because it does not extend to men, is
unavailing. This Court has frequently held that the legislative
authority, acting within its proper field, is not bound to extend
its regulation to all cases which it might possibly reach. The
legislature "is free to recognize degrees of harm and it may con-
fine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is
deemed to be the clearest."
Id. at 400. However, four dissenting justices argued that:
Difference of sex affords no reasonable ground for making
a restriction applicable to the wage contracts of all working
women from which like contracts of all working men are left
free. Certainly a suggestion that the bargaining ability of the
average woman is not equal to that of the average man would
lack substance. The ability to make a fair bargain, as everyone
knows, does not depend upon sex.
Id. at 413.
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), upheld under the equal protec-
tion clause a Michigan statute which forbade hiring female barmaids:
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from
working behind a bar. This is so despite the vast changes in the
social and legal position of women. The fact that women may
now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as
their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long
practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp
line between the sexes.
Id. at 465.
48. The text of the exception is quoted at note 16 supra. Since
discrimination on the basis of religion or national origin contravenes
19671
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Although the Constitution has been held not to prevent laws
based on sex classification, agreement with this doctrine has been
far from universal. The leading case espousing the doctrine,
49
was criticized during the House debate on the sex amendment to
the Civil Rights Bill.50 Support for constitutional invalidity of
statutory sex classifications has been strongly advanced in a re-
cent law review article5 ' suggesting either constitutional amend-
ment or judicial action.
A proposed equal rights constitutional amendment, which
would invalidate most state legislative classifications on the ba-
sis of sex,5 2 has been introduced in every Congress since 1923.
The proposal passed the Senate twice,5 3 but with qualifications
that considerabljr weakened the amendment's effectiveness.5 4
Presently, there appears little chance that such an amendment
will be adopted.
The argument that statutory sex classifications are constitu-
tionally invalid rests on the equal protection clause. The pro-
ponents of this view would extend the reasoning of Brown to
the area of sex discrimination:
Although the "classification by sex" doctrine was useful in
sustaining the validity of progressive labor legislation in the
past, perhaps it should now be shelved alongside the "separate
but equal" doctrine. It could be argued that, just as separate
schools for Negro and white children by their very nature can-
not be "equal," classification on the basis of sex is today in-
herently unreasonable and discriminatory. 55
Such an argument hardly follows from the reasoning of
Brown. There the statement that separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal, 5  resulted from a finding that the policy
national policy in the same manner as race discrimination, the exception
should be narrowly interpreted. This was indicated in the House Re-
port on the Civil Rights Bill, H.R. REP. NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 27
(1963). The report was issued before sex was added to the bill, so
there is no comment on the particular problems of the sex provision.
49. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
50. 110 CONG. REc. 2580 (1964) (remarks of Representative Griffiths
of Michigan).
51. Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimina-
tion and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 232 (1965); see 51 MINN.
L. REV. 552 (1967).
52. PREsiDENT's CoMissIoN ON THE STATUS or WOMEN, REPORT
OF THE COM=I=-EE ON CIV AND PoLrrIcAL RIGHTs 32 (1963).
53. 96 CONG. REc. 870-73 (1950); 99 CONG. REc. 8954-55 (1953).
54. The additional provision added to the amendment has provided
that it "shall not be construed to impair any rights, benefits, or exemp-
tions now or hereafter conferred by law upon persons of the female
sex." 99 CONG. REc. 8955 (1953).
55. Murray & Eastwood, supra note 51, at 240.
56. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the Negro group.51 The same cannot be said of
separation of the sexes, for this separation ordinarily rests on
valid differences in the biological and psychological composition
of the two sexes. The existence of separate educational facilities,
for example, reflects either a difference in the particular inter-
ests of one sex grouping, or a desire to preserve an educational
atmosphere free of coeducational distractions. It does not usu-
ally denote the inferiority of one of the sexes. 58
However one views the controversy over equal rights for
women, it cannot be denied that at present the Constitution per-
mits classification on the basis of sex for a wide variety of legis-
lative purposes. The fact that sex classification stands on so
different a constitutional footing from race classification must
be considered in formulating policies to best carry out the pur-
poses of Title VII.
The differences in the scope of permissible legal discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex and the other factors of Title VII reflect
the attitudes of the public. Women are biologically different
from men, and have traditionally assumed a different role in our
society. Few question the propriety of a men's club, a sexually
categorized school, or even a transportation facility for men
only.5 9 Yet the same type of separation if based on race is either
unlawful per se, unlawful when carried out by public authority,
or at the very least looked upon with disfavor as being contrary
to national policy.
Since a consideration of the legal background of classifica-
tion on the basis of the factors listed in Title VII reveals sharp
distinctions, it is unfortunate and perhaps misleading that the
prohibition on discrimination lists "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin" in such a way that they appear to call for
identical interpretation. Such an interpretation also ignores our
different national policies with respect to sex classification as
opposed to the others. The ban on sex discrimination and the
prohibition of other forms of discrimination should be viewed
separately; the enforcement of the mandate of the Civil Rights
57. Id. at 494.
58. But see Murray & Eastwood, supra note 51, at 233-35.
59. It is interesting to note that United Air Lines has for a number
of years operated "Executive" flights limited to male passengers without
offering any simultaneous service to women. This industry has been
closely regulated by the federal government, and there is no question
that a racially restricted service would have been neither contemplated
by the airlines nor tolerated by the government.
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Act of 1964 should be carried out in a manner consonant with the
developing national policies relevant to each case.
IV. THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
The Civil Rights Act establishes an Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission 0 charged with guiding implementation of
the substantive provisions of Title VII. One version of the Civil
Rights Bill6' would have patterned the Commission after the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, which has been so successful in
administering the National Labor Relations Act.6 2 As created,
the five member Commission, appointed by the President for
staggered five year terms with guaranteed political balance, 3
is structurally parallel to the NLRB. However, the principal
weapon contributing to the success of the NLRB, the cease and
desist order,6 4 has been withheld from the Commission. Instead,
the Commission must await the filing of charges by aggrieved
persons, and then investigate and attempt to encourage concilia-
tion and compliance with the law.65 Where definite patterns or
practices of discrimination are found, the Commission can ask
the Attorney General to bring an appropriate action authorized
by the act.66
Subsequent to Title VII's passage, the House of Representa-
tives considered a bill which would replace Title VII, strengthen-
ing enforcement measures, principally through introduction of
the cease and desist order.67 The Committee on Education and
Labor of the House stated in its favorable report on the bill that:
It is ... imperative that effective enforcement authority be
granted to the Commission. While the justification for this is
not new, it is compelling. The history of similar programs es-
tablished without enforcement provisions is proof enough. A
hollow declaration of rights without the means of asserting such
rights is a sham which degrades the law and makes a mockery
of the declared national policy.68
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to -15 (19641).
61. S. 1937, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
62. See 49 Stat. 451 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-4(a) (1964) provides in part: "[Tihe Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission . . . shall be composed of five
members, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same
political party. .. ."
64. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 49 Stat. 454 (1935),
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
66. Id. § 20O0e-4(f) (6).
67. H.R. 10065, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
68. H.R. REP. No. 718, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965). In testimony
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Thus, there exists some congressional sentiment favoring a
significant increase in the power of the Commission. Such an
increase in power would have a beneficial effect on the eradica-
tion of racial discrimination where the issues are relatively clear
cut, and the principal problem is one of effective enforcement.
With respect to sex discrimination, however, the desirability of
allowing the Commission to issue cease and desist orders is less
clear. Issuance of such orders would reduce the Commission's
flexibility, since the Commission would be required to determine
and articulate its policies to a much greater extent. Further,
the Commission arguably should be able to avoid specific pro-
nouncements on sex discrimination until it has gained greater
experience, facilitating more intelligent decisions. These argu-
ments, however, are not persuasive. The Commission could al-
ways reverse or modify a previous policy. Articulation of the
grounds for decision in specific cases would provide employees
and employers a much more reliable guide to their rights and
duties under the act. These advantages, in addition to the
strengthening of enforcement measures, would seem to justify
empowering the Commission to issue cease and desist orders.
In the first six months following the effective date of the
act, the Commission was innundated by some three thousand
complaints of unfair employment practices, 69 most of which
involved hiring practices. An overwhelming majority of the
complaints alleged racial discrimination against Negroes. The
only other significant category of discrimination charged was
sex discrimination, involving about one-sixth of the cases. How-
ever, in the instances of sex discrimination, the principal con-
cern was not with hiring but with layoff and seniority.70 This is
interesting since a primary objection to the sex provisions of
Title VII was a fear that women in large numbers would invade
the job areas jealously guarded by men, thus upsetting traditional
patterns of employment. 71 The actual experience under the act
before the committee, the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Jr., stated:
One point on which there is surely agreement is that there is a
need for statutory procedures to compel compliance. ...
There is a substantial preference for administrative enforce-
ment. ... [C]onciliation is most successful when the parties
know that effective machinery for enforcement is readily at
hand.
Id. at 20.
69. EQuAL EmmoYmr OPPoRTuNITY CoivnvxssioN, INromwAmiON
(Jan. 27, 1966).
70. Ibid.
71. 110 CoNG. REc. 2577 (1964) (remarks of Representative Celler).
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has been that women are more interested in fair treatment once
they have assumed a job than in equal access to jobs.7 2
While the problem of sex discrhnination has been involved in
only about one-sixth of the complaints received by the Commis-
sion, it has consumed a much higher proportion of the time of
the legal department of the Commission.73 To answer the many
questions raised by the sex provisions, the Commission has
handed down various opinions74 and guidelines75. Most of these
rulings involved enforcement procedures.
In December, 1965, the Commission published its Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of Sex.7 The Guidelines approach
the problem of the "bona fide occupational qualification" in a
negative fashion, describing a number of factors which are not
valid bases for discrimination. The only affirmative admission
of an exception is in a narrow area: "Where it is necessary for
the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commission will
consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an
actor or actress."
77
One approach taken to the problem in the Guidelines is that
applicants for jobs, male or female, must be treated as individu-
als rather than as members of a class. Thus, an employer cannot
rely on the bona fide occupational qualification provision to re-
fuse to hire a woman on the assumption that the turnover rate
among females in general is higher than among males. The same
principle applies to stereotyped characterizations of the rela-
tive abilities of men and women for a particular job. An in-
dividual cannot be refused a job merely because other members
of his or her sex have made a poor showing in that occupation. 7
The Guidelines go further, however, and state than an un-
lawful employment practice is committed in every case where
there is a "refusal to hire an individual because of the prefer-
ences of co-workers, the employer, clients, or customers."79 It
72. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUN.TY ComMIssIoN, supra note 69.
73. Interview with Senior Attorney of the Legal Department of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Washington, D.C., Jan.
21, 1966.
74. See, e.g., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMInssIoN, Di-
GEST OF LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS IssuED OR ADOPTED BY THE CoaiIs-
sioN (Oct. 8, 1965).
75. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on Dis-
crimination Because of Sex, 30 Fed. Reg. 14927-28 (1965).
76. Ibid.
77. Id. § 1604.1(a) (2).
78. Id. § 1604.1(a) (1).
79. Id. § 1604.1(a) (1) (iii).
[Vol. 51:877
SEX DISCRIMINATION
would seem that in some cases it might be very important to the
working harmony of a particular group of workers that all be of
the same sex. In a service industry, for example, it might be
important to clients that the employees be of one sex, or a
university may prefer that the Dean of Women be a woman.80
The same arguments could, of course, be made in cases of dis-
crimination on the basis of religion or national origin, but in
those cases there is such a clear national policy that the desires
of co-workers or customers must be subordinated. The question
does not even arise with respect to race discrimination, since
that is not a permitted ground of discrimination under the "bona
fide occupational qualification" exception.
With respect to advertising for employment, the Commis-
sion requires that preferences of employers not be expressed un-
less sex is a bona fide occupational qualification.8' "Help wanted
-male" columns in newspapers must be recaptioned, "Jobs of
interest-males," with an appropriate notice that the listing is
not intended to be exclusory but merely for the convenience of
the reader.8 2 To further inform individuals of their rights under
the law, and of the procedure for filing a complaint, the em-
ployers, unions, and agencies covered by the act are required to
post at conspicuous locations a poster prepared by the Commis-
sion 83 which summarizes the pertinent provisions of Title VII.
The approach of the Commission as evidenced by its publi-
cations has been fairly rigid. A narrow interpretation of the
bona fide occupational qualification exception has been an-
nounced, suggesting that only the most extreme cases will qual-
ify for the exception. There are at least two possible justifica-
tions for this approach. One is that it resolves the issues in a
clear manner. Another possible justification is that this ap-
proach gives maximum leverage for enforcement where needed,
while the desired flexibility at this early stage is achieved by
selective enforcement of only the more obvious abuses. At any
rate, the relative paucity of complaints concerning hiring on the
basis of sex may suggest that, practically, the problem is not
of sufficient magnitude to warrant more subtle interpretations
of the act.
80. This example was suggested in a letter from Representative
Green to the author, Jan. 17, 1966.
81. This requirement of the Commission is authorized by 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3 (1964).
82. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines, supra
note 75, § 1604.4.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (1964).
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V. THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO STATE LAWS
Title VII enters a field containing numerous potential con-
flicts with existing state laws. These state laws are of two basic
types: the state fair employment practices legislation, and the
state regulatory laws classifying persons on the basis of sex.
At the time of enactment of the Civil Rights Act, twenty-
five states had fair employment practices laws rendering racial
discrimination in employment unlawful in much the same man-
ner as Title VII. Hence, there was some question as to the inter-
relationship of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and the state agencies enforcing antidiscriminatory legislation.
Section 708 sets the tone for cooperation with the states by pro-
viding that:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or
relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punish-
ment provided by any present or future law of any State or
political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would
be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.8 4
To further encourage state initiative in this area, a sixty day
deferral to the state agency is required where there is an
applicable state law.8 5 The Commission is empowered to agree
with a state or local agency not to participate in a particular
class of cases.8 6 Such an agreement removes the federal right
otherwise available to aggrieved individuals. At present, ten
states prohibit sex discrimination in their fair employment prac-
tices laws.8 T In these states, the Commission has deferred to
the state agencies.
State laws which discriminate between the sexes are more of
a problem to the administration of Title VII. This problem is
peculiar to the sex area, since laws based on the other forms of
discrimination would be struck down as invalid under the four-
teenth amendment. At the time of the enactment of Title VII,
all but seven states had laws limiting the hours that women
could be required to work.88 About half the states prohibited
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964).
85. - Id. § 2000e-5. This section also provides that the period of
deferral shall be extended to 120 days where the state law is still in its
first year of effectiveness.
86. Id. § 2000e-8.
87. Arizona, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska,
New York, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming. WomEN's BureSAu, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR, LAWS ON SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 4(1965). All but two of these were enacted since the Civil Rights Act
became law.
88. PRESIDENT'S CoMIssIoN ON TnE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROTEC-IVE LABOR LEGISLATION 9 (1963).
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night work by women. Many states fixed the maximum weight
a woman could be required to lift in the course of her em-
ployment.8 9 Such laws were designed primarily for the protec-
tion of women, and have been upheld within the confines of
the test of reasonableness.9 0 Some of the protective statutes have
been unsuccessfully challenged as anachronisms, as unduly re-
strictive measures, or as outright discriminations against women
to "protect men's rights to the better paying jobs."91
Section 708 of the act 92 is relevant to these statutes, but it
begs the question as to which state laws are invalid under the
act. Thus, the Commission must decide which state laws seem
to contravene the policy of Title VII.
The Commission has not adopted an extreme approach to
the problem. It might have decided to permit all state regula-
tory laws passing the constitutional test of reasonableness. In
view of the liberal test that has been applied to such state legis-
lation by the Supreme Court,9 3 this would probably mean that
all existing state legislation would be valid. The saving clause in
section 708, denying validity to state laws contrary to the policy
of Title VII, would then have no effect, except to invalidate any
future legislation so arbitrary as to be unconstitutional.
Conversely, the Commission might have decided that the
policy of Title VII required invalidation of any state legislation
that purported to classify persons on the basis of sex. This
would be improper, however, in view of the "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification" exception. This interpretation of section 708
would also contradict Title Virs general policy of accommodat-
ing the interests of the states.
The Commission's approach has been to divide state laws
regulating female employment into two categories: (a) those
which prohibit employment of women in hazardous, arduous, or
nocturnal jobs; and (b) those which confer special benefits on
89. Ibid. These laws place varying ceilings on the weight a woman
can be required to lift. Fifteen pounds (Utah) is the minimum; twenty-
five pounds is typical.
90. See note 47 supra.
91. 110 CONG. REc. 2580 (1964) (remarks of Representative Griffiths
of Michigan).
92. Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or
relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punish-
ment provided by any present or future law of any State or
political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would
be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 20e-7 (1964).
93. See note 47 supra.
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women when employed, such as laws regulating minimum
wages.9 4 Those laws falling into category (a) will be studied
by the Commission to determine their validity in the context of
modern conditions. 95 The Commission questions whether:
Congress intended to disturb such laws and regulations which
are intended to, and have the effect of, protecting women
against exploitation and hazard. Accordingly, the Commission
will consider limitations or prohibitions imposed by such state
laws or regulations as a basis for application of the bona fide
occupational qualification exception. However, in cases where
the clear effect of a law in current circumstances is not to pro-
tect women but to subject them to discrimination, the law will
not be considered a justification for discrimination. 96
Those laws falling into category (b) will not qualify for the
"bona fide occupational qualification" exception. Thus, an em-
ployer cannot refuse to hire a woman "in order to avoid provid-
ing a benefit for her required by law-such as minimum wage
or premium overtime pay."97 However, since such laws merely
provide special benefits for employed women rather than dis-
criminatingly prohibit their employment through discrimination,
they are not invalid. Therefore, an employer who hires women
must comply with these laws, and an interesting question is
therefore presented as to what an employer must pay to his
male employees. If the provisions of the act are now applied, it
would seem that the employer must pay his male employees
what the woman is receiving, and the men receive the benefit
of a state law intended only for women. Such a result is be-
yond the intention of the federal statute, and thus should not
be reached.
This approach of the Commission, falling between the two
possible extreme positions discussed above, seems justified only
so long as the process of ruling on state laws is done gradually,
starting with those statutes which most clearly operate in a
discriminatory manner.
CONCLUSION
The sex provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have re-
ceived relatively little publicity compared to that given the par-
allel provisions banning racial discrimination, yet the sex provi-
sions potentially affect a far greater number of Americans. Their
94. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines, supra
note 75, § 1604.1(a) (3).
95. Id. § 1604.1(b).
96. Id. § 1604.1(c).
97. Id. § 1604.1(c) (2).
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impact on nearly every employer in the nation could have a
profound effect on traditional patterns of employment. Despite
the significance of this new law, there is ambiguous language in
the text of the statute and a dearth of meaningful legislative
history. With so much uncertainty and so much at stake, the
Commission faces a difficult task in enforcing the sex provisions
of the act.
Deprived of precise language and legislative history for guid-
ance in interpretation, the Commission should attempt to treat
each of the prohibited forms of discrimination under the act so
as to conform with national policies developed in related areas.
In this regard, the considerable tolerance in our Constitution
for the numerous state laws classifying persons on the basis of
sex must be considered. The contrast with the intolerance of
racial classification is relevant. The prohibition of sex discrimi-
nation is novel legislation, and its goals are therefore uncertain.
For this reason the Commission should proceed cautiously with
respect to the sex provisions, building on experience in individual
cases rather than establishing rigid guidelines at the outset.
The work of the Commission thus far has convinced many
that its statutory powers are too limited for the job it must do.
Thus, a power to issue cease and desist orders would facilitate
administration of the act. At the same time, the Commission
should modify its position on the sex provisions through a broader
interpretation of the "bona fide occupational qualification" ex-
ception.
Finally, with respect to the problem of state laws bearing on
the matter of classification by sex, the spirit of cooperation with
the state fair employment practices legislation is noteworthy.
On the other hand, there is also much state legislation regulating
employment of women which potentially frustrates the policy of
Title VII. The difficulty of separating those laws which protect
women from those which in effect discriminate against them
creates a problem for the Commission; so far, the Commission
had adopted a flexible and sensible position.
19671

